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LABOR LAW-EMPLOYER'S OBLIGATION TO BARGAIN
WITH RESPECT TO His DECISIONS CONCERNING SUBCONTRACTING
Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation, motivated solely by
economic reasons, determined that $250,000 could be saved an-
nually by contracting out work presently performed by its main-
tenance employees. At the time, however, the corporation was
bound by a collective bargaining agreement with the United
Steelworkers of America, the exclusive bargaining representa-
tive for the unit of maintenance workers affected by the deci-
sion. As the expiration date of the agreement approached, the
employer was uncooperative in scheduling a meeting with the
union for the purpose of negotiating a new contract.' Finally,
four days before the collective bargaining agreement was to
expire, the corporation informed the union of its decision to
subcontract the maintenance work. Fibreboard assumed that it
was not obligated to bargain collectively with respect to its
economic decision to subcontract work, and further assumed it
would be pointless to negotiate a new contract with employees
whose employment would terminate upon the expiration of the
existing contract. However, the National Labor Relations Board,
on rehearing, decided that even though the employer had been
motivated solely by economic considerations, failure to negotiate
with the union concerning the decision to subcontract consti-
tuted a violation of section 8 (a) (5)2 of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
ordered enforcement of the decision in its entirety. On certio-
rari, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed. Held,
irrespective of the employer's motives, the employer violated
section 8 (a) (5) of the act because his decision to subcontract
maintenance work, involving the replacement of employees in
the existing bargaining unit with those of an independent con-
tractor to do the same work under similar conditions of employ-
ment, is subject to the duty to bargain collectively. Fibreboard
Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 85 Sup. Ct. 398 (1964), affirming
1. The contract provided for automatic renewal for another year unless one
of the contracting parties gave a sixty-day notice of desire to modify or terminate
the contract. Pursuant to the terms of the contract, the union gave timely notice
of its desire to modify the terms of the contract and sought to arrange a bargain-
ing session with the company representatives.
2. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1958) [hereinafter cited as§ 8(a) (5)1.
3. The Court also affirmed the Board's power to apply the remedy consisting




sub nom., East Bay Union Machinists v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 411
(D.C. Cir. 1963) .4
Section 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act pro-
vides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
"to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees." Section 8(d)5 defines collective bargaining as "the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment." (Emphasis added.) The Supreme Court has ruled
that all subjects which fall within the language of section 8(d)
shall be considered "mandatory" or "statutory" subjects of
collective bargaining.6 Upon request of either party, the em-
ployer and the representative of his employees must collectively
bargain all such subjects; failure to bargain in good faith is a
violation of the act. However, neither party is obligated to yield
its position; thus an employer or the union may, in good faith,
insist upon its proposal concerning a mandatory subject to the
point of an "impasse" in negotiations. 7
Whether subcontracting based purely upon economic consid-
erations is a subject included within the phrase "wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment" has long been
uncertain. Originally, the Board held that if an operational
change was occasioned solely by business considerations, the
employer was obligated to bargain only concerning the effects
of the change.8 However, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
enforcing a Board decision in the Town & Country case,9 ex-
4. The original opinion in Fibreboard is found in 130 N.L.R.B. 1558 (1961).
This was reversed on rehearing, in an opinion appearing in 138 N.L.R.B. 550
(1962), and later enforced by the court of appeals in the decision cited in the
text. This Note uses the name Fibreboard to refer to all the opinions rendered
during the course of litigation.
5. 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1958) [hereinafter cited as
§ 8(d)].
6. NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958) ; Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co. v. NLRB, 213 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1954).
7. See note 6 supra.
8. NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 212 (1960), affd, 293 F.2d
170 (2d Cir. 1961) ; Krantz Wire & Mfg. Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 971 (1952).
9. Town & Country Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963), enforc-
ing 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962). The employer subcontracted his trucking opera-
tions approximately one month after certification of the union representing his
drivers. The Board found that the decision to subcontract was based upon an
anti-union attitude; however, the Board asserted "that Respondent's unilateral
action in this regard, even if it was taken . . . because of economic considerations,
constituted an unlawful refusal to bargain, for we believe that Respondent was
under a statutory obligation to bargain as to its decision to subcontract."
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panded the employer's obligation to bargain and forced him to
bargain with respect to the decision to subcontract the em-
ployees' work. On the basis of the Town & Country decision,
the Board reconsidered its original decision in Fibreboard and
issued a supplemental decision ordering Fibreboard to bargain
collectively over the decision to subcontract its maintenance
work.10 The Board's decision seemed extremely broad, as it
contained no language of limitation; thus it could have been
interpreted as obligating the employer to bargain every decision
to subcontract work which has any effect upon his employees.
However, in subsequent decisions the Board in effect limited
the scope of its Fibreboard holding. Even prior to the Supreme
Court decision in Fibreboard, the Board held, in Motorsearch
Co.," that the employer had not violated the act by failing to
bargain with the union concerning the decision to subcontract,
because the union knew of the subcontracting and made no at-
tempt to bargain about it during eighteen consecutive bargain-
ing sessions. Further, in Shell Oil Co.12 the Board held that the
employer did not violate the act by failing to bargain with the
union before subcontracting his employees' work because the
subcontracting clause in the collective bargaining agreement
implied consent that the employer could subcontract occasional
(Emphasis added.) 136 N.L.R.B. at 1026. Additionally, the Board specifically
overruled its prior decision in Fibreboard, 130 N.L.R.B. 1558 (1961).
10. 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962).
11. 51 L.R.R.M. 1240 (1962).
12. 57 L.R.R.M. 1271 (1964). The collective bargaining agreement contained
a clause which allowed the employer to subcontract work provided that, in the
event he subcontracted work which could have been performed by his own em-
ployees, the independent contractor's employees must be paid certain wages pre-
scribed by the collective bargaining agreement. The union proposed removal of
the clause in forty-seven bargaining sessions, but the employer remained firm
and refused to limit his right to subcontract. The agreement finally expired but
the parties continued operating under the terms of the contract, more specifically,
under the subcontracting clause. At this time the employer let a group of sub-
contracts and the Board held as stated in the text. The same holding also applied
to subcontracts let after the new collective bargaining agreement was enacted
which contained the same subcontracting clause.
However, after termination of the first collective bargaining agreement and
before the new agreement was enacted, the union struck. During this strike the
employer let another group of subcontracts. The Board held that the employer
was not under an obligation to bargain over these subcontracts let and completed
in the course of the strike as this temporary subcontracting necessitated by the
strike did not transcend the reasonable measures an employer may take in order
to maintain operations in such circumstances.
'In General Motors Corp., 57 L.R.R.M. 1277 (1964), a similar case, the Board
determined the employer had not violated the act by transferring employees from
one unit to another because the decision made was essentially a change of method
without resulting layoff or discharge and was a management prerogative recog-
nized by the union in its national collective bargaining agreement.
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maintenance work without prior notice to, and consultation with,
the union.
Although the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
affirmed the Board's decision in Fibreboard13 without limitation,
other appellate courts were reluctant to adopt the Board's broad
position. In Hawaii Meat Co. v. NLRB,'14 the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit held the employer had not committed an
unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain concerning the
decision to subcontract, since the decision was made while the
union was engaged in a strike; and the court stressed that the
employer's general right to replace economic strikers eliminated
the necessity to bargain. In NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc.,15 the
13. 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
14. 321 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1963). Following certification the union and the
employer could not reach an agreement through collective bargaining. When it
became obvious there was to be a strike, the employer considered subcontracting
the company's delivery service. Upon commencement of the strike, the subcontract
went into effect and the employer began replacing the economic strikers. It was
clear there was no anti-union motive; rather the decision to subcontract was
made as a means of keeping the company operating during the strike. The trial
examiner and the Board found the employer had violated § 8(a) (5) by sub-
contracting its delivery operations without first giving the union an opportunity
to bargain.
In Empire Terminal Warehouse Co., 58 L.R.R.M. 1589, 151 N.L.R.B. No.
125 (March 31, 1965), the Board held that the employer did not violate the act
by failing to notify and consult with the union before subcontracting unit work
during a strike because: (a) the subcontracting was prompted by request of the
employer's customers, not by the employer's desire to have other persons perform
his employees' work; the subcontracting was instituted solely as a temporary
measure to continue the business relationship with his customers; (b) throughout
the period of the dispute the company continued to bargain in good faith with
the union about contract terms in general and the subcontracting issue in par-
ticular; the employer did not attempt to undercut the union, rather, he continued
to recognize the union as the representative of the strikers and their replacements;
and (c) despite the subcontracting, the employer did not eliminate, permanently
or otherwise, any unit jobs or otherwise alter or impair the bargaining unit; the
subcontracting did not exceed what was necessary to protect the employer's cus-
tomers whose deliveries were in jeopardy. The decision was based on the Board's
earlier decisions in Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 58 L.R.R.M. 1257 (1965) (see note
20 infra), and Shell Oil Co., 57 L.R.R.M. 1271 (1964) (see note 12 8upra).
15. 322 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1963). The employer and the union had entered
into three contracts over a period of time. In each negotiation the employer had
rejected the union's proposal concerning inclusion of a clause in the contract
prohibiting substitution of independent contractors on company routes. In 1959
the employer initiated a series of meetings to discuss the unfavorable competitive
situation created by the lower costs of other dairies. The average earnings for
the employer's driver-salesmen were $14,495 per year for a 30-38 hour average
work week. When no agreement could be reached, the employer informed the
union of its decision to subcontract and that all positions of the driver-salesmen
were terminated. The court announced that the decision on the part of the em-
ployer to terminate a phase of its business and distribute all of its products
through independent contractors was not a required subject of collective bar-
gaining. However, the court asserted that after the decision to subcontract has
been made, § 8(a) (5) does require negotiation with reference to the treatment of
the employees who were affected by the decision. Id. at 562. The court distin-
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Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit completely repudiated
the Board's supplemental decision in Fibreboard by refusing to
expand the employer's obligation to bargain to include the de-
cision to subcontract. Manifestly, a Supreme Court decision was
needed to establish uniformity and to eliminate the conflicts and
confusion existing among the various circuits.
The majority of the Supreme Court in Fibreboard declared
that "contracting out" is well within the literal meaning of the
phrase "terms and conditions of employment" and therefore a
statutory subject of collective bargaining. 6 The Court supported
this declaration with two interrelated propositions. First, the
Court reasoned that classifying "contracting-out" of work as a
mandatory subject-of collective bargaining would effectuate the
policies of the National Labor Relations Act by promoting in-
dustrial peace. Second, the Court asserted that bargaining on
the employer's decision concerning subcontracting of work was
common practice in the United States today and has proved
extremely successful. Industrial experience indicated that in-
cluding subcontracting within the terms of section 8(d) would
not be a drastic change in procedure. Thus the Supreme Court
settled the question concerning whether the decision or the ef-
fects of the decision must be bargained.
More significantly, the Court explicitly stated that its de-
cision is limited to the facts of the case - the replacement
of the employees in the existing bargaining suit with those of
an independent contractor to do the same work under similar
conditions of employment. The Court asserted that "our decision
need not and does not encompass other forms of 'contracting
out' or 'subcontracting' which arise daily in our complex econ-
omy."1'7 This desire to limit the holding was re-emphasized by
the concurring Justices, who apparently feared that the ma-
jority opinion might be misunderstood.18
guished Town d Country on the basis of the employer's anti-union motivation.
As for the rehearing in Fibreboard, the court stated: "If the latter case (Fibre-
board) can be considered as holding views contrary to those expressed herein, we
find it unimpressive." 322 F.2d at 562, n.1.
16. 85 Sup. Ct. at 403.
17. Id. at 405.
18. Id. at 407. The concurring Justices felt that the majority opinion radi-
ated "implications of such disturbing breadth" that they were moved to concur
separately in order to assure that the decision was only applicable where the
employer's decision to subcontract work involved "the replacement of employees
in the existing bargaining unit with those of an independent contractor to do
the same work under similar conditions of employment."
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Thus it appears the Supreme Court did not wish to make
subcontracting per se a mandatory subject of collective bargain-
ing; on the other hand, the Court's statement that the decision
was limited to the facts of the case probably does not mean
that there are no other situations in which the employer would
be obligated to bargain over his decision to subcontract. The
Supreme Court, although exercising great care in limiting its
decision within the narrowest possible confines, suggested no
tests for determining when the employer was obligated to bar-
gain over his decision to subcontract, with the exception of the
statement that under the facts of Fibreboard "to require the
employer to bargain about the matter would not significantly
abridge his freedom to manage his business."' 9 Presumably,
therefore, the Supreme Court left the Board and the lower courts
free to determine when the obligation to bargain with respect
to subcontracting exists.
Westinghouse Electric Corp2 was the first pertinent case
after the Supreme Court's decision in Fibreboard. The trial
examiner, relying on the Fibreboard decision, concluded that
by failing to bargain with the union before subcontracting work
which could have been performed by equipment and manpower
within the bargaining unit, the employer committed an unfair
labor practice under section 8(a) (5) .21 The Board, however,
although agreeing that generally the contracting out of work
done, or which may be done, by employees in a bargaining unit
is a subject of mandatory bargaining, stated that Fibreboard
was not intended to establish a rigid rule to be mechanically
applied regardless of the relevant facts. The facts of the West-
inghouse case showed that the recurring subcontracts were
19. Id. at 404. The facts of the case showed that the company's decision to
contract out the maintenance work did not alter the company's basic operation,
the maintenance work still had to be performed in the plant, and no capital
investment was contemplated.
20. 58 L.R.R.M. 1257 (1965). The union, since 1940, had been the statutory
bargaining representative for some 3,000 employees at the employer's plant. From
the beginning, subcontracting had been a continuing phase of the employer's
operation. Although the union had sought restrictions on the established subcon-
tracting practices at previous contract negotiations, they had been wholly unsuc-
cessful. Subcontracting during this period had consisted of about 7,700 contracts
of which approximately 3,000 could have been performed by the employer's main-
tenance employees. Before subcontracting the employer had considered the eco-
nomic feasibility of doing the work with his own employees; however, the em-
ployer did not notify, consult with, or advise the union each time it awarded a
subcontract.
21. The trial examiner's decision supports the contention that the Fibroboard
doctrine could easily have been broadly construed. See note 18 mpra.
NOTES 9451965]
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motivated solely by economic considerations, that they com-
ported with the traditional methods by which the employer
conducted his business operations, that they did not during the
period in question vary significantly in kind or degree from
previously established practice in the plant, that they had no
demonstrable adverse impact on the employees within the bar-
gaining unit, and that the union had the opportunity to bargain
about changes in the existing subcontracting practices at gen-
eral negotiating meetings. On the basis of all these facts cumu-
latively, the Board found that the employer did not have to give
notice to, or consult with, the union with respect to subcontract-
ing the work in question. The Board reasoned that the Fibre-
board doctrine was meant to apply only if the subcontracting
departed from previously established operating procedure, af-
fected a change in conditions of employment, or resulted in a
significant impairment of job tenure, employment security, or
reasonably anticipated work opportunities for those in the bar-
gaining unit.
Subsequent Board decisions have relied on the Westinghouse
decision and upheld its general principles, placing special em-
phasis on findings that the subcontracting did not constitute a
significant detriment to the employees within the bargaining
unit and that the employer was following an established prac-
tice of unilateral subcontracting, which the union had neither
protested nor attempted to limit.22 In the recent General Tube
22. See, e.g., Superior Coach Corp., 58 L.R.R.M. 1369 (1965). The parties'
existing collective bargaining agreement contained no specific provisions on sub-
contracting; the union had proposed a clause which would have required bargain-
ing on subcontracting and the employer had rejected it. Over the years the em-
ployer had followed a long-standing practice of subcontracting work that possibly
could have been performed by his maintenance employees. The union now alleged
a violation of the act the employer's unilateral subcontracting. The Board held,
relying on Westinghouse, that the employer did not violate his bargaining obliga-
tion because: (a) it was apparent the employer followed this subcontracting prac-
tice for purely economic consideration; (b) the subcontracting did not cause any
change in the "existing employment terms and conditions of the unit employees";
(c) 'it was a long-established practice; and (d) the work subcontracted was
"temporary in nature and not the type normally associated with the employer's
day-to-day operation."
In Fafnir Bearing Co., 58 L.R.R.M. 1397 (1965), the Board, although refus-
ing to comment on the significance of a general management rights clause in the
contract, held the employer had not violated the act by failing to notify and con-
sult with the union concerning the decision to let five subcontracts. As to the
first subcontract the employer was not required to bargain because it did not
coace'n work done by employees within the bargaining unit. The other four sub-
contracts involved bargaining unit work, but there was no violation of the act
because". (a) the subcontracts did not have an adverse effect upon unit employees;
and (b) the-'employer was following a long-eLstablished ptactice with which the
[Vol. XXV
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CO6 3 case, the Board held that even though the evidence was
insufficient to show the existence of a previously established
practice of subcontracting, the employer did not violate the act
by refusing to bargain with respect to his decision to subcon-
tract, because the subcontract neither resulted in any significant
detriment to the employees within the bargaining unit nor
changed their employment conditions.
This rapidly changing area of law may be summarized at
present as follows: the Fibreboard doctrine certainly extended
the coverage of section 8(d) to include many of the employer's
decisions to subcontract work which affects his employees. In
determining which decisions will be subject to the obligation
of collective bargaining, one must observe all Board decisions
applying the Fibreboard principle, most of which have tended
to limit the doctrine. It is suggested that "terms and conditions
of employment" will include all economic decisions to subcon-
tract work unless:
(a) there is an implied waiver of the employer's obligation
to bargain in light of previously established procedures
involving subcontracting to which the union did not
protest ;24 or
employees had neither protested nor attempted to limit.
Both Kennecott Copper Corp., 57 L.R.R.M. 1217 (1964) and American Oil
Co., 58 L.R.R.M. 1412 (1965) held the employer had not violated the act by
failing to notify the union before subcontracting when: (a) there was no signif-
icant detriment to the employees within the bargaining unit; and (b) either
long established practice was followed or a broad management prerogative clause
reserved the right to the employer to take such action.
23. In General Tube Co. & Int'l Union, AFL-CIO, 151 N.L.R.B. No. 89
(March 19, 1965), the employer was charged with an 8(a) (5) violation because
he unilaterally subcontracted work without first bargaining concerning his deci-
sion. The employer defended, alleging he had followed his normal industrial prac-
tice. However, the evidence showed that at most the employer had subcontracted
similar work on only one previous occasion; it failed to show there was a well-
established practice of subcontracting prior to the subcontract with which the
instant case was concerned. Although the employer's defense of "prior established
practice" was not supported, the Board nevertheless found other reasons for hold-
ing that the employer's unilateral action in subcontracting was not violative of
the act. The Board held there was no probative evidence that the loss of the
overtime by the employees within the unit resulted from the subcontract; however,
even if it be assumed that some loss of overtime may have resulted from the
subcontract, it does not appear that such a loss had a substantial impact upon
the unit employees' terms and conditions of employment. As the total overtime
lost for each employee was only nine hours, there was no "significant detriment
to the employees or change in their conditions of employment." The Board deci-
sion cited the prior decisions of Kennecott, 57 L.R.R.M. 1217 (1964) ; Shell Oil
Co., 57 L.R.R.M. 1271 (1964) ; and General Motors Corp., 57 L.R.R.M. 1277
(1964).
-24. This test was enunciated in Motorsearch Co-., 51 L.R.R.M. 1240 (1962),
and later re-emphasized in Superior Coach Corp., 58 L.R.R.M. 1369 (1965)
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXV
(b) the subcontract did not constitute a significant detri-
ment to the employees within the bargaining unit;25 or
(c) there is an express or implied waiver of the employer's
obligation to bargain through the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement ;26 or
(d) under the facts of the case, enforcement of the employ-
er's obligation to bargain with respect to his decision to
subcontract would constitute an unfair burden upon the
employer which would significantly abridge his freedom
to manage his business.27
These tests are too general to provide the employer an infallible
guide to safety. It is submitted that unless the employer is
absolutely certain that his decision to subcontract falls outside
the duty to bargain-if, for instance, the facts of his case are
Fafnir Bearing Co., 58 L.R.R.M. 1397 (1965) ; and Kennecott Copper Corp.,
57 L.R.R.M. 1217 (1964).
25. This test was enunciated in Westinghouse and applied in all of the deci-
sions listed in note 24 supra. It is important to note that in all of those decisions
the Board held that the employer had not violated the act in refusing to bargain
because both tests labeled (a) and (b) in the text were met. However, General
Tube asserted that test (b) by itself is sufficient to protect the employer from
an unfair labor practice charge. Query: what would the Board hold when the
the employer's unilateral decision to subcontract was in accord with previously-
established practice but also constituted a significant detriment to the employees
within the bargaining unit? It is suggested that General Tube stands for the
proposition that fullfillment of either test by itself is sufficient to protect the
employer.
26. See Shell Oil Co., 57 L.R.R.M. 1271 (1964) ; General Motors Corp., 57
L.R.R.M. 1277 (1964).
27. This test appears extremely general and elusive. That such an exception
might be applied to Fibreboard was first indicated in the Board decision in Shell
Oil discussed at note 12 aupra. Additionally, in Shell Oil the Board stated that
temporary subcontracting necessitated by a strike did not transcend the reason-
able measures an employer may take in order to maintain operations in such cir-
cumstances. The probable existence of such an exception or limitation to the
doctrine was re-emphasized in the language of the Supreme Court's decision in
Fibreboard, where there was an implication that the employer would not have
been required to have bargained his decision concerning the subcontract had the
obligation to bargain significantly abridged his freedom to manage his business.
The existence of such a limitation appears to have been substantiated by the
recent Empire Terminal Warehouse decision, see note 14 supra, in which the
Board held that employer could subcontract during an economic strike if in good
faith and only as a temporary measure aimed at continuing his business relation-
ship with his customers.
It appears that any time an employer is forced to bargain collectively his
freedom to manage his business is limited to some degree; it is therefore sub-
mitted the Board probably will require extreme circumstances before this test
will be applied. Presumably, the employer will not be required to bargain his
decision to subcontract under this test only when his employees are involved in an
economic strike and such a decision is necessary to continue the business, or
irrespective of whether the employees are on strike, the employer's very existence
as an enterpreneur depends upon a timely decision concerning. the subcontracting
Of the work.
an exact replica of a case already decided-he acts at his peril2s
in subcontracting the work without first negotiating his deci-
sion with the collective bargaining representative of his em-
ployees involved.
Julian Clark Martin
LABOR LAW - SECTION 301 AND REQUIRING EXHAUSTION
OF GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES
Maddox, a laid-off employee of Republic Steel Corp., sued in
an Alabama state court three years after his discharge to re-
cover severance pay under a collective bargaining contract. The
agreement provided for severance pay if any of Republic's mines
were closed permanently, thereby resulting in layoff of the mine
workers.1 Although the contract contained a grievance pro-
cedure culminating in binding arbitration, Maddox, rather than
utilize that mode of redress, sought relief in the courts for de-
fendant employer's breach of the collective bargaining agree-
ment.2 The trial court entered judgment for the former em-
ployee, and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.8 On cer-
tiorari the United States Supreme Court reversed, one Justice
dissenting. Held, the federal labor policy which requires that
individual employees desiring to assert contract grievances at-
tempt to use the contract grievance procedure agreed upon by
the employer and the union as the mode of redress applies to
severance pay grievances, thereby precluding the aggrieved em-
ployee from resorting initially to the state courts for relief.
Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 85 Sup. Ct. 614 (1965).
28. If the employer subcontracts without bargaining, and later is found guilty
of an 8(a) (5) violation, the Board has available the harsh remedy of compelling
resumption of the subcontracted operation, and reinstatement of the employees
with back pay. See note 3 8upra.
1. 85 Sup. Ct. at 615, n.1.: "The section of the contract dealing with severance
allowance provided in relevant part: 'When, in the sole judgment of the Company,
it decides to close permanently a plant or discontinue permanently a department
of a mine or plant, or substantial portion thereof and terminate the employment
of individuals, an Employee whose employment is terminated either directly as a
result thereof because he was not entitled to other employment with the Com-
pany under the provisions of Section 9 of this Agreement-Seniority and Sub-
section C of this Section 14, shall be entitled to a severance allowance in accord-
ance with and subject to the provisions hereinafter set forth in this Section 14.' "
2. For this grievance procedure set out in the contract, see 85 Sup. Ct. at
620, n.2.
3. 158 So. 2d 487 (Ala. App. 1960), af'd, 158 So. 2d 492 (Ala. 1963).
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